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The Attorney/Client Privilege:
A Fond Memory of Things Past
An Analysis of the Privilege Following
United States v. Anderson
Michael M. Mustokoff
Jonathan L. Swichar
Cheryl Roth Herzfeld*
INTRODUCTION
The every day practical importance of the attorney/client priv-
ilege was dramatically brought home in the recent prosecution
and dismissal of charges in the case United States v. Anderson.
The Anderson indictment alleged that the legal advice provided
by two attorney defendants was used to structure arrangements
between hospital executives and physicians to assure payments
to the physicians for patient referrals in violation of the Anti-
Kickback Act.1 Anderson is notable for its 180-degree turn.
Pre-trial, the grand jury judge relied upon the government's ex
parte, in camera evidence to find a prima facie demonstration of
the crime-fraud exception to the attorney/client privilege. The
court used the exception to justify the extension of use immu-
nity to the attorneys compelling their testimony before the
grand jury. The attorneys were subsequently indicted, only to
have the case against them dismissed on a motion for judgment
of acquittal. At trial, the Honorable John W. Lungstrum found
that even after "giving the Government every reasonable [infer-
ence] to which it is entitled, . . . no reasonable jury could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that [the attorneys] ...willfully
committed any of the criminal acts charged in the Indictment."'2
* Michael M. Mustokoff, J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1972 is a
partner in Duane, Morris & Heckscher LLP and represents health care providers in
regulatory, civil and criminal proceedings. Jonathan L. Swichar, J.D., Temple Univer-
sity Law School, 1997 and Cheryl Roth Herzfeld, J.D., University of Pennsylvania
Law School, 1999 are associates of the firm and practice in the areas of commercial
litigation, white collar criminal defense and investigations, and health care fraud
defense.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1995).
2. Transcript of Trial Before Honorable Judge W. Lungstrum (3/9/99), Vol. 49, at
7339, lines 14-24, United States v. Anderson (D. Kan. Nos. 98-20030-JWL).
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The significance of Anderson and its cross currents are far
reaching. The case touches every lawyer who counsels a client
whose first question is, "can I get away with it?" Anderson also
impacts corporate compliance programs and their hotlines. The
Justice Department's present policy seeking "voluntary disclo-
sure" of possible false claims is problematic. It flushes up em-
ployees' statements made to corporate counsel under the
presumptive protection of what was once regarded as the com-
mon law's most sacrosanct privilege - communications be-
tween attorney and client.
The purpose of this article is to address the rudiments of the
attorney/client privilege, its crime-fraud exception, corporate
compliance programs, the United States government's quest for
voluntary disclosure, and how those principles have been af-
fected by United States v. Anderson.
I. UNITED STATES v. ANDERSON
A. The Alleged Scheme
On July 15, 1998, two physicians, three hospital executives
and two health care attorneys were indicted by a federal grand
jury in the District Court of Kansas in the case of United States
v. Anderson. The indictment charged the physicians, executives
and attorneys with conspiring to violate the federal Anti-Kick-
back Act, 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b, which criminalizes payments for
referrals in return for the purchasing, leasing, ordering, or ar-
ranging of any good or service paid for by federally funded
health care programs. According to the indictment, the physi-
cians provided services to a large number of nursing home re-
sidents who were eligible to receive reimbursement from
Medicare and Medicaid. When the need arose, the physicians
referred those same patients to the conspiring hospitals. In re-
turn, the hospitals entered into agreements with the physicians
to provide consulting services. The government alleged that the
hospital's payments to the physicians were a "sham" in ex-
change for referrals, and not for the purported consulting ser-
vices, which were never provided.
The Baptist Medical Center had the most extensive business
arrangement with the physicians. Not only did Baptist allegedly
execute a "sham agreement" to pay for referrals, it also agreed
to refer specimens for testing to a laboratory owned by the phy-
sicians and to split the laboratory fees with them. Baptist also
extended a substantial line of credit to the physicians and for-
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gave the debt by way of the laboratory fee-splitting arrange-
ment. Baptist eventually bought the physicians' interest in the
lab.
B. The Attorneys' Involvement in the Alleged Scheme
The indictment alleged that two health care attorneys struc-
tured the business ventures to ensure the continued referrals of
nursing home patients, and also to conceal the payments by pre-
paring "sham" agreements and modifying existing agreements
to eliminate express references to patient referrals. The attor-
neys were charged with facilitating the kickback scheme.
The indictment cited a 1989 letter sent by one of the attorneys
to two Baptist executives on "how to draft proposals for other
hospitals which would conceal the fact that the hospitals were
paying the doctors for the referral of patients."' 3 The letter fur-
ther stated "[y]ou will note that this proposal makes no refer-
ence to nursing home patients referrals . . . . It is absolutely
essential that there be no documentation of any intent to refer
patients for services or items for which Medicare or Medicaid
might pay."4
The indictment also cited a letter that the second attorney
wrote, discussing services that the physicians were already pro-
viding their nursing home patients "which could be utilized to
justify compensation from the Medical Center to the Medical
Group."' 5 The attorney was also accused of drafting an employ-
ment agreement between Baptist and the physicians, whereby
Baptist would forgive certain indebtedness of the physicians in
exchange for "charity care"'6 that the physicians were already
giving to certain nursing home patients. The indictment noted
that in 1992, the same attorney informed Baptist that the rela-
tionship with the Medical Group needed to be radically restruc-
tured, that the terms of the restructuring should be determined
in face-to-face meetings, and "that nothing in writing should be
exchanged by the parties until the terms of the restructuring
have been decided."7 Further, the indictment cited a conversa-
tion between the lawyers wherein they discussed the physicians'
compensation arrangements. During this discussion, one attor-
3. Superseding Indictment, at p. 29, 65, United States v. Anderson (D. Kan. No.
98-20030-JWL).
4. Id. at p. 29-30, 65.
5. Id. at p. 21, 135.
6. Id. at p. 26, 48.
7. Id. at p. 30, T 66.
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ney allegedly informed the other that the physicians had been
selling "old folk referrals" at another hospital, that "they were
scum" and that she "did not know what [doctors] did for their
money. "8
C. Piercing of the Attorney/Client and Work-Product
Privileges Before the Grand Jury
The lawyers were subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury.
To foreclose the lawyers from asserting a Fifth Amendment
privilege claim, the prosecutor obtained approval to compel
their testimony in return for statutory use immunity. Their cli-
ents intervened and objected to the testimony based on the at-
torney/client and work-product privileges. The government
responded that the crime-fraud exception vitiates the attorney/
client and work-product privileges. The government filed an in
camera, ex parte good faith statement of evidence regarding the
attorneys' involvement in the alleged criminal activity. The
grand jury judge, the Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, found,
based on her review of this statement, that "the government has
established through substantial and competent evidence a prima
facie case that [Baptist and its president] have committed a
crime," that Baptist and its president used the attorneys' legal
services "in furtherance of that crime," and that they were
"aware of the criminal conduct."9
Judge Vratil found that the crime-fraud exception to the at-
torney/client and work-product privileges applied, and held that
the lawyers could not "avoid testifying as to any act, communi-
cation, document or other written matter concerning the rela-
tionships and agreements whether formal or informal, written or
unwritten, executed or proposed . "..."10 Significantly, Judge
Vratil also refused to permit the defendants to view the govern-
ment's evidence or conduct a hearing to rebut such evidence."1
The Tenth Circuit upheld the Judge Vratil's order holding that
the crime-fraud exception vitiated the attorney/client and work-
product privileges between the attorneys and their client.' 2 The
grand jury judge found that the government had established by
substantial and competent evidence a prima facie case that the
8. Id.
9. In re: Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 660-61 (10th Cir. 1998).
10. Id. at 661.
11. See id. at 657.
12. Id. at 661.
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client had committed a crime, and that the attorneys' services
had been used to further that crime. 13 The Tenth Circuit re-
jected the attorneys' claim that the District Court's application
of the exception was overly broad. The Tenth Circuit stated that
the court was not required to "conduct a detailed review of all
questions and answers prior to their presentation to the grand
jury. Instead, district courts should define the scope of the
crime-fraud exception narrowly enough so that information
outside the scope of the crime-fraud exception will not be elic-
ited before the grand jury. ' 14 Finally, the Tenth Circuit rejected
the contention that the District Court was required to disclose
the government's ex parte, in camera submission and hear rebut-
tal evidence. The Tenth Circuit stated that the "determination
of whether the government shows a prima facie foundation in
fact for the charge which results in the subpoena lies in the
sound discretion of the trial court.., that determination can be
made ex parte and a 'preliminary minitrial' is not necessary. "15
D. Relief for Some but Not for All
At the close of the government's case, the trial judge granted
a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal in favor of the attor-
neys. Judge Lungstrum held that it was undisputed that the law-
yers who dealt with or reviewed that transactions had a good
faith belief that it was possible to facilitate some legal business
relationship between the hospitals and the physicians. Accord-
ing to the court: "[g]iving the Government every reasonable [in-
ference] to which it is entitled, pursuant to the very stringent
legal standard applicable to motions for judgment of acquittal,
no reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
[the attorneys] ... willfully committed any of the criminal acts
charged in the Indictment.' 1 6 The court further wrote that it
was:
firmly convinced from the evidence presented that the only
reasonable inference a jury could draw is that the lawyers,
each in their own turn, attempted to advise their clients to en-
gage in legal transactions and that these two Defendants did
not prepare sham agreements to paper over a fraud, but,
13. Id. at 660-61.
14. Id. at 661.
15. Id. at 662 (quoting In Re September 1975 Grand Jury, 532 F.2d 734, 737 (10th
Cir. 1976)).
16. Transcript of Trial Before Honorable Judge W. Lungstrum (3/9/99), Vol. 49, at
7339, lines 14-24, United States v. Anderson (D. Kan No.98-200030-JWL).
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rather, tried their best to prepare agreements that would re-
flect what they intended to be legal transactions into which
they believed their clients desired to enter. The state of the
law was in flux; and the lawyers adapted their advice to it as it
changed.' 7
Four of the five remaining defendants were found guilty of giv-
ing and receiving kickbacks.
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND WORK
PRODUCT PRIVILEGES
A. Privileged No More
Despite the acquittal of the Anderson attorneys, the case is
alarming for both health care attorneys and their clients. The
government's case was made by piercing what was previously
thought to be virtually impenetrable, the attorney/client and
work product privileges. Anderson demonstrates just how po-
rous the privilege actually is. The case requires both those giv-
ing and receiving legal advice to revisit the boundaries of these
privileges.
The attorney/client privilege is of critical importance in the
health care arena, where the passing of complex compliance is-
sues is routine. Modern health care law is a regulatory swamp.
It is made more dangerous by providers being pressured by re-
cent reductions in reimbursement and the need for revenue
maximization. Health care attorneys must be alert to the limita-
tions of the clients' privileges even as they provide counsel. A
full discussion of the subtleties of the privileges and their excep-
tions is beyond the scope of this Article. A brief summary of
the basic precepts, however, is helpful to a thorough under-
standing of Anderson.
B. The Attorney/Client Privilege
The attorney/client privilege is the oldest of the privileges
known to the common law that protects confidential communi-
cations.' The purpose of the privilege is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients. 19 The
17. Id. at 7342-43 (lines 13-25). The Government's case against the attorneys was
severely limited by the absence of any direct testimony concerning their alleged par-
ticipation in the scheme beyond what could be inferred by the documents described in
the indictment.
18. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
19. See id.
[Vol. 9
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privilege only protects communications between the attorney
and his or her client, not the underlying facts on which those
communications are based.2° The burden of proving the attor-
ney/client privilege is on the party seeking to claim its benefit.2'
The privilege attaches when legal advice of any kind is sought
and provided by a lawyer. Any communications made in confi-
dence by the client to the lawyer are permanently protected
from disclosure unless the client waives the privilege.22 The cli-
ent, not the attorney, holds the privilege. A lawyer may not tes-
tify about communications made by a client unless released by
the client to divulge such communications. Because most clients
are not lawyers with knowledge of the intricacies of the privilege
or how the privilege must be raised to be preserved, counsel has
a professional obligation to advise the client of the existence of
the privilege and raise it on the client's behalf. The practical
consequence of the privilege, absent any exceptions, is that
there cannot be voluntary or compelled disclosure by the lawyer
of confidential communications made by the client for the pur-
pose of seeking legal advice. Thus, the privilege exists as protec-
tion against testimonial compulsion for the lawyer or client
concerning communications made between them for purposes of
legal counsel, thereby encouraging the public to seek and be
completely forthright with legal counsel.23
C. The Work-Product Privilege
The counterpart to the attorney/client privilege is the work-
product privilege, which prohibits the disclosure of any docu-
ments that reveal an attorney's mental processes, strategies or
theories.24 The work-product privilege has been found applica-
ble in grand jury proceedings and certain administrative pro-
ceedings as a matter of federal common law. Either the lawyer
or client can invoke the work-product privilege. The privilege,
however, can be waived by the client even if the lawyer generat-
ing the product continues to assert it. The Supreme Court has
held that "such work-product cannot be disclosed simply on a
20. See id. at 395.
21. See Colonial Gas Co. v. AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 F.R.D. 600, 604 (D.
Mass. 1992).
22. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
23. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391 (quoting ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 4.1).
24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
20001
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showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the
equivalent without undue hardship. 2 5
III. TI- EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGES
A. The Crime-Fraud Exception
The most disturbing aspect of Anderson was its requirement
that the attorneys testify and produce documents concerning
their client communications. Anderson serves as notice to both
attorneys and their clients that the exceptions to the privileges
deserve special attention. In Anderson, many of the documents
introduced by the government to prove the alleged conspiracy
were attorney's notes, attorney/client letters and memoranda.
Although most lawyers are cognizant of the crime-fraud ex-
ception, the point at which it may be used to pierce the privilege
is not easily determined. The crime-fraud exception is intended
to deter clients from using the attorney/client relationship for
improper purposes. "It is the purpose of the crime-fraud excep-
tion to the attorney/client privilege to assure that the 'seal of
secrecy' . . . between lawyer and client does not extend to com-
munications 'made for the purpose of getting advice for the
commission of a fraud' or crime. 126 The crime-fraud exception
applies to both the attorney/client and work-product privi-
leges.2 7 The application of the crime-fraud exception is contin-
gent on whether the communications relate to past or future
wrongs. Communications remain privileged when the lawyer is
consulted with respect to past wrongdoing, and only lose their
privileged character when the attorney is consulted in order to
further a continuing or contemplated criminal or fraudulent
scheme. 8
The crime-fraud exception does not require a completed
crime or fraud, but rather only requires that the client consulted
the attorney in an effort to complete one. 29 The crime-fraud ex-
ception does not require that the attorney be aware of the ille-
gality involved. Any communication between client and
attorney can be "in furtherance of" the client's criminal conduct,
25. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401.
26. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (quoting Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) and O'Rourke v. Darbishire, 1920 A.C. 581, 604 (P.C.)).
27. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 723 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir.
1983).
28. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena 92-1(SJ), 31 F.3d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1994).
29. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Marc Rich & Co. A.G.), 731
F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 9
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even if the attorney does nothing after the communication to
assist in the client's commission of a crime, and even though the
communication turns out not to help (and perhaps even hinders)
the client's completion of the crime.30 In order for the exception
to apply, however, the party seeking application of the excep-
tion must make a prima facie showing of intent to commit a
crime. 31 Accordingly, it is the client's knowledge and intentions
that are of paramount concern when applying the crime-fraud
exception.
B. Application of the Crime-Fraud Exception: All Ties in
Favor of the Government
Anderson sheds light on the government's leverage to over-
turn assertions of the privilege. A party seeking to invade the
attorney/client or work-product privileges, pursuant to the
crime-fraud exception, must make a prima facie case that the
client was engaged in or planning a criminal or fraudulent
scheme when the client sought the advice of counsel to further
that scheme. 32 The party must also show that the attorney's as-
sistance was obtained in furtherance of the criminal or fraudu-
lent activity or was closely related to it.33 The exact quantum of
proof necessary to meet the prima facie standard is without a
universal definition.34 Mere allegations of criminality are insuf-
ficient to warrant application of the exception. 35 The govern-
ment cannot successfully allege that it has a "sneaking suspicion
that the client was engaging in or intending to engage in a crime
30. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of the Corp., 87 F.3d 377, 382 (9th Cir.
1996).
31. See Sound Video Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1482, 1487
(N.D. I11. 1987).
32. See In re Grand Jury Invest., (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1987).
33. See id. The second prong requires that there be some causal connection be-
tween the crime or fraudulent conduct and the legal advice sought. "The second
prong is satisfied by a showing that the communication is related to the criminal or
fraudulent activity established under the first prong." Id. at 1227. Like the first
prong, courts have enunciated different formulations for the degree of relatedness
necessary to meet that standard. See, e.g., In re Int'l Sys. and Controls Corp. Securi-
ties Litigation, 693 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting the sought-after "work
product must reasonably relate to the fraudulent activity"); In re Sept. 1975 Grand
Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734, 738 (10th Cir. 1976) (requiring, in a grand jury proceeding,
only that a "potential relationship" exist between the work-product and the conduct
being investigated.). Nonetheless, the different formulations share a common pur-
pose: identifying communications that should not be privileged because they were
used to further a crime or fraud. See Schroeder, 842 F.2d at 1227.
34. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563, n.7.
35. See Schroeder, 842 F.2d at 1226.
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or fraud when it consulted the attorney. ' 36 Such a threshold
might effectively discourage many potential clients from con-
sulting an attorney about entirely legitimate legal dilemmas.37
C. Procedure for Evaluating a Prima Facie Showing
In Anderson, the government was permitted to present ex
parte evidence to the district court regarding the alleged involve-
ment of the lawyers in the criminal activity. The defendants,
however, were denied the opportunity to rebut this evidence.
The leading case discussing the procedures to be followed in
evaluating the evidence required to make a prima facie showing
is United States v. Zolin.38 In Zolin, the IRS, as part of its inves-
tigation of L. Ron Hubbard, filed a petition to enforce a sum-
mons directing the production of certain documents.39 The
intervenors, the Church of Scientology and Hubbard's wife, op-
posed the production of the materials based upon the attorney/
client privilege. 0 The IRS argued that no such privilege at-
tached as a result of the crime-fraud exception, and requested
an in camera review of the documents.41 The Supreme Court
held that a district court may, in appropriate circumstances, con-
duct an in camera review of privileged documents to assess
whether they fall within the crime-fraud exception. 2 Noting
that in camera review is a smaller intrusion upon the confiden-
tiality of the attorney/client relationship than is public disclo-
sure,"4 3 the Zolin Court concluded that the evidentiary showing
36. In re: Grand Jury Proceedings of the Corp., 87 F.3d at 381.
37. See id. The circuits that have attempted to delineate what is prima facie evi-
dence have devised different standards. See, e.g., In re: Grand Jury Proceedings of the
Corp., 87 F.3d at 381 (defining prima facie as "reasonable cause to believe" that the
attorney was used in furtherance of an ongoing unlawful scheme); In re: Richard
Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995) (defining prima facie as "probable cause to
believe that a crime or fraud has been attempted or committed, and that the commu-
nications were in furtherance thereof"); Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 95-
96 (3d Cir. 1992) (defining prima facie evidence as evidence that if believed by the
fact finder would be sufficient to support a finding that the elements of the crime-
fraud exception were met); In the Matter of Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 625-26 (7th Cir.
1988) (explaining the prima facie test is "not whether the evidence supports a verdict
but whether it calls for inquiry.").
38. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
39. See id. at 557-58.
40. See id. at 558.
41. See id. at 558-59.
42. See id. at 565.
43. See id. at 572 (citing Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the
Attorney/client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REv. 443-
467 (1986)).
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necessary to trigger in camera review "need not be a stringent
one.""
Zolin thus requires a district court to conduct a two-step anal-
ysis. First, the court must "'require a showing of a factual basis
adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person'
that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to
establish the claim the crime-fraud exception applies. '4 5 Once
this threshold showing is made, the court must make a discre-
tionary decision whether to order in camera review. Courts sub-
sequent to Zolin have inconsistently reviewed challenges to the
crime-fraud exception. In Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.,4 6 the
Third Circuit held that the district court erred in finding the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney/client privilege sufficient
to order the production of documents without according the
companies an opportunity to rebut.47 The court stated where a
fact finder undertakes to weigh evidence in a proceeding seek-
ing an exception to the privilege, the party invoking the privi-
lege has the "absolute right to be heard by testimony and
argument. ' 48 Other courts have not agreed. In these cases,
courts have held that motions to quash subpoenas served upon
lawyers should not turn into minitrials.4 9
Based on Zolin and its progeny, the government need only
make a prima facie showing that the legal advice was sought in
furtherance of a crime or fraud. There is no need to show that
the lawyer knew of, or was a participant in, the crime or fraud.
During grand jury proceedings, this showing is made ex parte to
the judge supervising the grand jury. The lawyers and clients
involved can ask for an opportunity to submit evidence on the
issue, but it is not error for the supervising judge to deny them
that opportunity. The lawyer and client have no legal right,
however, to: (1) know what the government told the judge in
order to make the showing; (2) to present any rebuttal evidence
to the government's showing; or (3) present other evidence of a
legitimate reason that the client sought the lawyer's advice.
44. Id. at 572.
45. Id. (quoting Caldwell v. District Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982)).
46. 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
47. See id. at 94.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Schroeder), 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th
Cir. 1987).
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRIVILEGES AND A
LAWYER'S ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
A. Other Confidentiality Considerations
Confidentiality of client communications is not governed
solely by the attorney/client privilege. Lawyers also have ethical
obligations to maintain client confidences, even if they are not
privileged. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 of the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not know-
ingly: (1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client; (2) use a
confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the cli-
ent; and (3) use a confidence or secret of his client for the ad-
vantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client
consents after full disclosure. 50 Furthermore, Rule 1.6 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that, subject to
certain stated exceptions, "[a] lawyer shall not reveal informa-
tion relating to representation of a client.
51
There are exceptions to the general rules of confidentiality. A
lawyer has an ethical duty to never advise a client to engage in
conduct that is criminal or fraudulent.5 Rule 1.2(d) states that:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client,
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but
a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a
client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law.53
Difficult questions may arise when it is not clear to the lawyer if
the client intends to commit a criminal or fraudulent act. When
the client's objectives are clearly unlawful, a lawyer will not be
able to avoid disciplinary action or other liability by simply pro-
fessing ignorance. A lawyer is generally justified in assuming
that the client is using the lawyer's counsel for lawful purposes.
However, if the lawyer knows facts which, viewed objectively,
would suggest the client seeks legal representation to assist it in
perpetrating a fraud or committing a crime, the lawyer must
make further inquiry before proceeding.5 4 The lawyer must de-
50. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1969).
51. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995).
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1995).
53. Id.
54. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. No.
1470 (1981).
[Vol. 9
12
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol9/iss1/5
Attorney/Client Privilege after Anderson
termine whether he or she has a duty to inquire about the cli-
ent's intent.
If the lawyer perceives the representation will violate Rule
1.2(d), then Rule 1.16(a)(1) mandates the lawyer to withdraw
from or to decline the representation. Rule 1.16(a) provides
that "a lawyer shall not represent a client, or where representa-
tion has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if ... the representation will result in violation of the
rules of professional conduct or other law."'55 On the other
hand, Rule 1.16(b)(1) provides that an attorney may withdraw
from representation, if the client persists in a course of action
involving the lawyer's services which the lawyer believes is crimi-
nal or fraudulent.56
B. Confidentiality in Counseling Health Care Clients
Application of these rules in the context of health care repre-
sentation poses perplexing issues. The intent of parties to an
agreement to induce referrals may not be clear. The fair market
value of services may not be easily determined. Rule 1.2(d) pro-
vides, however, that a lawyer asked to draft an agreement for a
client cannot do so if the facts would suggest the client's objec-
tives are illegal or fraudulent. The lawyer must either decline to
assist the client, withdrawing from the representation if neces-
sary, or make sufficient inquiry to establish the legitimacy of the
transaction. If a client advises the lawyer that it has identified
past overbilling, there does not appear to be a violation of Rule
1.2(d). If the client, however, states that it will not make reim-
bursement, Rule 1.2(d) dictates that while the attorney need not
withdraw, he may not advise on matters relating to the violation.
In that regard, ABA Formal Opinion 92-366, dated August 8,
1992 seems to control:
We do not believe that knowledge of a client's ongoing fraud
necessarily requires the lawyer's withdrawal from representa-
tion wholly unrelated to the fraud, even if the fraud involves
the lawyer's past services or work product. On the other hand,
complete severance may be the preferred course in these cir-
cumstances, in order to avoid any possibility of the lawyer's
continued association with the client's fraud. We would simply
point out, however, that withdrawal from matters totally unre-
lated to the fraud is more likely to be permissive, and gov-
55. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (a)(1) (1995).
56. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (b)(1) (1995).
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erned by Rule 1.16(b), than mandatory under Rule
1.16(a)(1).57
If, despite the lawyer's advice, the client advises he will proceed
in criminal conduct with or without the lawyer, then the lawyer
must resign. The next question is whether the lawyer must in-
form regulatory agencies and other parties of impending con-
duct. The answer depends on each state's ethics rules. In most
states, the attorney has discretion to disclose, while in some
states, he must disclose the client's intent to commit a crime.58
V. COMPLICATIONS IN APPLYING THE ATTORNEY/CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT
Anderson also raises questions concerning the application of
the attorney/client and work-product privileges in the corporate
context. In general, the corporate client includes not only the
chairman of the board, the CEO or others in control, but also
employees with authority to act on behalf of the corporation.
The privilege extends to confidential communications between
corporate counsel and an employee who, as an agent of the cor-
poration, is seeking legal advice on a matter of interest to the
corporation.
Anderson illustrates how complications can arise when an em-
ployee seeks to invoke the attorney/client privilege based upon
a communication with corporate counsel. In Anderson, one of
the key issues was whether Anderson, Baptist's president, had
standing to assert the attorney/client privilege.5 9 By the time the
case reached the Tenth Circuit, however, Baptist had reached a
settlement agreement with the government, and no longer as-
serted the attorney/client privilege for itself or its officers. The
Tenth Circuit stated that any privilege resulting from communi-
cations between corporate officers and corporate attorneys con-
cerning matters within the scope of the corporation's affairs
belongs to the corporation and not to its officers.60 Once the hos-
pital waived the privilege, the court found that an intervenor
had no power to assert privileges other than those relating to his
individual capacity.6'
57. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. No.
92-366 (1992).
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (1995); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1969).
59. See In re: Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 658.
60. See id.
61. See id.
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The Anderson court recited several factors necessary to deter-
mine whether an employee may assert a personal privilege with
respect to conversations with corporate counsel: (1) the em-
ployee must approach counsel for the purpose of seeking legal
advice; (2) when the employee approaches counsel, he or she
must make it clear the legal advice is sought in their individual,
rather than in their representative, capacities; (3) counsel must
see fit to communicate with the employee in his or her individ-
ual capacity, even though a possible conflict could arise; (4) the
conversation with counsel must be confidential; and (5) the sub-
stance of the conversation with counsel cannot concern matters
within the company or the general affairs of the company.62
Adopting this rather unworldly test, the Tenth Circuit found
that a limited attorney/client privilege existed between Baptist's
president and the attorneys.63 "It include[d] only that very small
portion of communications in which Intervenor sought legal ad-
vice as to his personal liability without regard to any corporate
considerations."64
Anderson raises the issue of "whom" the lawyer represents.
Does the representation encompass the corporation alone or the
individual corporate officers as well? If the lawyer represents
both, one cannot waive the privilege for the other. Each has the
right to assert the privilege independently. Representing a cor-
poration thus poses difficult ethical problems. Where a lawyer
seeks information from an uninformed corporate employee who
may believe the lawyer is representing him, that subjective be-
lief does not create an attorney/client relationship. Thus, where
there is a risk that the employee being interviewed may have
personal liability, the attorney must warn the employee before a
question is asked that legal advice from another lawyer may be
appropriate.
Careful consideration should also be given to determining
who within the organization has authority to waive the privi-
leges. All employees and witnesses interviewed during the
course of the investigation should be advised that although the
interview is covered by the attorney/client and work-product
privileges, the employer may decide to waive the confidentiality
of their communications without seeking their consent.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 659.
64. See id.
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VI. HOTLINES, VOLUNTARY SELF-DISCLOSURE AND THE
DEATH OF PRIVILEGE
If Anderson raises complications in corporate representation,
those difficulties are compounded by the government's insis-
tence on corporate compliance and the threat of program pre-
clusion. Viewed in the harsh light of retrospect, seemingly
innocent inquiries about billing practices and provider relation-
ships are subject to misinterpretations by the government. The
limits of the privileges, as defined in Anderson, affect corporate
compliance initiatives.
Corporate compliance hotlines have become essential ele-
ments of standard corporate integrity programs. Their purpose
is to allow anyone in the organization to make inquiries or re-
port suspicions of wrongdoing without fear of retribution. Hot-
lines are effective and cost-efficient. Attorneys other than
compliance officers are rarely the recipients of calls. Some com-
panies enlist a service to screen the calls. Thus, hotline discus-
sions are also susceptible of becoming evidence.
Despite the potential significance of the reported allegation
or the litigation that might follow, the compliance officer's re-
port generally will not be protected under the attorney/client or
work-product privileges. The communication is not made in
confidence by a client to an attorney for the purpose of legal
advice, and does not reveal an attorney's mental processes or
theories. Thus, the optimal type of hotline reporting system
should only elicit enough information to determine whether
counsel is required. If further inquiry is necessary, the more de-
tailed, and often more sensitive, communications will remain
confidential and protected by the attorney/client and work-
product privileges while the appropriate course of action is
determined.
Another component of corporate compliance has been the
promotion of voluntary disclosure programs. As part of Opera-
tion Restore Trust, the United States Department of Health and
Human Services unleashed a voluntary disclosure program en-
couraging health care providers to self-report matters that ad-
versely affect its programs. Theoretically, past misconduct is to
be disclosed in exchange for minimizing the cost and disruption
of an investigation, negotiating a monetary settlement in lieu of
prosecution and exclusion from federal programs.
The program makes no promises as to the consequences of
disclosure. Under the threat that disclosed information may be
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used against either the corporate entity or its officers and em-
ployees, the decision whether to make a voluntary disclosure,
and to what extent, is one of the most difficult decisions for
health care lawyers. The client will want to know the conse-
quences of disclosure, and will need advice as to the alterna-
tives. Anderson makes clear that the advice provided by
counsel, as well as the client's decision about whether to take
that advice, can have significant, if not criminal, consequences
for both client and attorney.
Anderson demonstrates that attorney/client communications
may not be protected from disclosure if the client is later investi-
gated or brought to trial. The viability of the privileges depends
on the client's conduct after the communication occurs. If the
client stops the inaccurate billing practices, the attorney/client
and work-product privileges will apply to a conversation involv-
ing past conduct. The privileges will still apply even if the client
decides not to voluntarily disclose, because the communication
only involved past overbilling. Where the client chooses not to
follow counsel's advice, the privilege is extinguished by the
crime-fraud exception.
VII. LESSONS FROM ANDERSON
The indictment and subsequent prosecution in Anderson illus-
trates the risks and responsibilities of rendering health care ad-
vice. Any sanctity that once may have accompanied the
attorney/client privilege is gone. Attorneys can no longer as-
sume that all communications with their clients will be privi-
leged. Advice given to clients that could be construed as
assistance in facilitating contemporaneous or future crime will
fall within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney/client and
work-product privileges, and will not be protected.
Mark R. Thompson, one of the attorneys indicted and then
exonerated in Anderson opined that federal prosecutors act on
"the original sin theory" - that is, if health care providers and
their counsel so much as discuss a provider's questionable
course of action, prosecutors will take the position that fraud
has been committed. Although there may be some hypersensi-
tivity attributable to Thompson's "close call with the hang man",
his warning deserves attention. In light of Anderson, health care
attorneys and their clients must be proactive in taking steps to
protect themselves. There are several measures that, if taken,
may prevent the situation that occurred in Anderson:
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Assume the advice given may eventually be made available for
the government's review;
Document one's notes to show that the attorney clearly ad-
vised the client as to the boundaries of legal and illegal
conduct;
Document transactions to demonstrate that they are aimed at
legitimate business purposes and not improper motives;
Take reasonable steps to ensure that the terms of any arrange-
ment about which advice is given are being complied with on
an ongoing basis;
Analyze financial relationships to identify how an auditor or
prosecutor might seek to portray them;
Make clear to corporate employees of the client that they are
not represented individually;
Immediately retain outside counsel for all parties involved if
the government launches an investigation of a transaction the
attorney helped to structure; and
Realize that if a client fails to take an attorney's advice and
then knowingly commits a crime or fraudulent act, then any
communication in furtherance of that crime or fraudulent act
will not be protected by the attorney/client or work-product
privileges.
Despite these precautions, any advice given to a client who is
subsequently accused of fraud may be fair game for investiga-
tors. Corporate clients and their counsel must be careful about
what is said, and even more careful about what is written. Off-
hand remarks and opinions can have unexpected consequences.
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